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TAKING THE RISK OUT OF TERMINATION: AN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
ANALYSIS OF THE NORMATIVE SYSTEM OF EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 
CHALLENGED BY HONDA v KEAYS 
 




“Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing the individual 
with a means of financial support and…a contributory role in society.  A person's 
employment is an essential component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and 
emotional well-being.”1 
- Chief Justice Dickson, 1987 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over many years, Canadian courts have crafted a unique body of employment law 
jurisprudence.  The purpose of this paper is to discuss how that jurisprudence was 
unraveled when the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in Honda v. Keays.2  
That holding, in effect, overturned aspects of Wallace v. United Grain Growers;3 a case 
that transformed how non-unionized employees were thought of and treated in Canadian 
society.  This paper examines the analytical underpinnings of wrongful dismissal law’s 
previous regime on bad faith damages and juxtaposes it to the new regime in Keays, 
concluding that the shift in focus from employer misconduct to employee losses 
exacerbates the employment relationship’s power imbalance and deprives employees of 
protection when they need it the most.  In reaching this conclusion, the paper uses the 
analytic frameworks of reflexive regulation and enterprise risk management to predict 
how employers will react to their newfound advantage.  The finding is that by taking the 
risk out of termination, there is now downward pressure to do away with the normative 
                                                
* Ryan Henry Edmonds, Hons BA, JD, is a graduate of Osgoode Hall Law School's Labour and 
Employment Law Program and is currently articling in the Toronto office of an international law 
firm.  He wishes to thank Osgoode's labour and employment faculty, including Eric Tucker, Sara 
Slinn, and Stacey Ball, for their superb instruction, and in particular thank Patric Senson, Janice 
Rubin, and David Doorey for their mentorship and inspiration.  Any errors, of course, are the 
responsibility of the author. 
 
1 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at 368. 
2 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 SCR 362 [“Keays”]. 
3 [1997] 3 SCR 701 [“Wallace”]. 
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“upwardly ratcheting” system of employment standards that workplaces enjoyed under 
Wallace. 
 
EXPLAINING CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: RISK AND REGULATION 
i. Theories of Regulation: Centralized and Reflexive Regulation 
Academic literature posits two kinds of regulatory force: “centralized” (or “command 
and control”) regulation and “decentered” (or “reflexive”) regulation.  In either case, the 
state’s purpose is to exert influence over how the target entity comports itself.  Whether 
it is centralized or reflexive regulation, this is done by creating a situation where risk 
management, with respect to that influence, is prioritized vis-à-vis other competing 
objectives.4   
With centralized regulation, the state’s intention is to strictly hold the target to a set of 
rules.  If not followed, then the rules are enforced by subjecting the target to sanctions.5  
Thus, the decision-making process with respect to centralized regulation is for the target 
to prioritize rule compliance for fear of punishment.  Consider employment standards 
legislation,6 which sets out terms of the employment relationship that employers must 
observe.  Typically this includes limiting working hours,7 setting a minimum wage,8 
statutorily protecting leaves of absence,9 and requiring that appropriate notice of 
termination be given.10  Centralized regulation posits that an employer will comply with 
employment standards because the risk of sanctions is greater than any profit that could 
be derived from non-compliance.11 
Reflexive regulation, which is the focus of this paper, operates quite differently.  With 
the centralized approach, there are limits in terms of jurisdiction and substance as to 
what may be regulated.12 The state may have a preference for certain conduct, but for 
one reason or another, it may be inappropriate or impossible to enforce this preference 
with a sanction.  In such cases, scholars argue that reflexive regulation holds the 
answer.13  Rather than compelling conduct with sanctions, reflexive regulation operates 
                                                
4 Bridget M. Hutter and Clive J. Jones, “From Government to Governance: External Influences on 
Business Risk Management” (2007) Regulation & Governance 27. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See e.g. Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41. 
7 Ibid, s 17. 
8 Ibid, s 23. 
9 Ibid, ss 46-53. 
10 Ibid, ss 54-66. 
11 Ibid, s 133-139.  Also, certain remedies prescribed for certain standards have a normative 
element as well.  See s 53, which permits reinstatement for breaches of statutory leaves.  For an 
empirical analysis of the questionable effectiveness of reinstatement as a remedy for employment 
disputes in Quebec, see Gilles Trudeau, “Is Reinstatement a Remedy Suitable to At-Will 
Employees?” (1991) 30 Indus Rel 302. 
12 David J. Doorey, “Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices through Reflexive 
Domestic Disclosure Regulation” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 353 at 366 [Doorey, “Who Made 
That?”]. 
13 Ibid. 
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by influencing the target’s normative practices by shaping the context in which 
interaction occurs.14  A classic example is the American Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act,15 which requires lending institutions to disclose a racial breakdown of loan 
recipients in order to discourage racially preferential lending practices.16  The logic is 
that by making a breakdown of loan recipients public record, this information could be 
used to antagonize malfeasant lenders.  By creating a risk of public shaming, the intent is 
to influence lending practices by making the target prioritize compliance vis-à-vis any 
profit it could derive from the discouraged course of action.  In other words, reflexive 
regulation posits that by injecting risk into the decision making process, a corporation’s 
behaviour will be steered towards the preferred course of conduct.17 
Reflexive regulation’s application to labour law is not new, however discussion of it has 
previously been confined to issues of transnational labour regulation.  David Doorey has 
argued that if disclosure of apparel manufacturers’ factory locations were required, 
employers would improve labour standards for fear of the risks created by NGO groups 
exposing “sweatshop” conditions.18  In an alternative vein, Sabel, O’Rourke and Fung 
propose a “ratcheting” theory of transnational labour standards.19  This theory is 
premised on requiring corporations to disclose information on labour standards to 
transnational monitoring groups, who in turn rank the firms according to certain indicia.  
The idea is that high profile companies would compete to build their reputation as 
socially responsible actors, and the competition would result in a transnational “upward 
ratcheting” of voluntarily adopted labour standards.  In what follows, this paper proposes 
that Canadian workplaces previously enjoyed a hybrid form of normative “ratcheting” 
labour standards via the risks associated with the ubiquitous threat of Wallace damages.  
However, since Keays has taken much of the risk out of termination, it is argued that this 
system of reflexive regulation is no longer in effect. 
ii. Theories of Risk: Enterprise Risk Management 
For reflexive regulation to have any normative force, the target must perceive (and 
prioritize) risk in the situation it is faced with.20  Consequently, this paper will interpret 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 12 USC 2800. 
16 Doorey, “Who Made That?” at 373. 
17 David J. Doorey, “Can Factory List Disclosure Improve Labor Practices in the Apparel 
Industry? A Case Study of Nike and Levi-Strauss” (2008) [unpublished], online: CLPE Research 
Paper Series 1 http://www.comparativeresearch.net/index.jsp at 8 [Doorey, “Factory List 
Disclosure”]. 
18 See generally, David J. Doorey, “In Defence of Transnational Domestic Labor Regulation” 
(2010) Vanderbilt J of Trans L 953; Doorey, “Who Made That?”; Doorey, “Factory List 
Disclosure”. 
19 Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke and Archon Fung, “Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulations for 
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace” (2000) KSG Working Paper Number 00-010, 
Columbia Center for Law and Economic Studies. 
20 Ryan Henry Edmonds, “Reflexively Regulating International Labour Practices: Are We There 
Yet? An Enterprise Risk Management Analysis of Social Disclosure” (2010) [unpublished, 
submitted in fulfillment of ‘International and Comparative Labour Law’ (3040.3N) at Osgoode 
Hall Law School] online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737931. 
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the risk component of reflexive regulation in accordance with the principles of 
Enterprise Risk Management (“ERM”).   
The individual components of ERM have long been functions of sound business 
management, but ERM as a cohesive discipline and function of senior management 
emerged only recently.21  In response to public pressure from the collapse of Barings 
Bank and other financial disasters of the 1990s, public-private consortium groups 
published a number of guidelines on best accounting practices for internal financial risk 
controls.22  Notably, however, these guidelines also urged companies to go beyond 
financial risk and to begin accounting for risks posed by law, health and safety, the 
environment, reputational damage, and so on.23  As a result, ERM as an independent, 
cohesive discipline emerged from the amalgamation of financial risk, operational risk, 
and strategic risk.  Although ERM is prescribed for banks and other financial 
institutions,24 policy makers have strongly recommended that all businesses adopt it as a 
matter of good corporate governance,25 making it a useful framework for present 
purposes. 
In order to appreciate an employer’s response to the new requirements for Keays 
damages, it must be emphasized that ERM is not merely a discipline aimed at risk 
mitigation.  Rather, ERM’s service to a company lies in its value-creation function 
because ERM is uniquely positioned to exploit risk-generating events in a way that 
advances the company’s interests.26  For example, consider risk hedging; once an ERM 
practitioner identifies a risk to the company, he or she will undertake another risky 
activity in order to offset that risk.  Insurers who hedge mortality risks by selling both 
life insurance and business annuity insurance to the same customer group are the classic 
example of this.27  As businesses exist to derive profit for their shareholders, ERM’s 
propensity for value-creation makes it a useful framework to examine and predict 
employers’ responses to Keays. 
The three disciplines within ERM are financial risk, operational risk, and strategic risk.  
Each is an independent discipline in its own right, but they are joined together under the 
                                                
21 See eg, Casualty Actuarial Society, “Overview of Enterprise Risk Management”, online: 
http://www.casact.org/research/erm/overview.pdf at 3 [ERM, “Overview”].  See also Lisa K. 
Meulbroek, “Integrated Risk Management for the Firm: A Senior Manager’s Guide” (2002) 
[unpublished] online: http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers2/0102/02-
046.pdf and Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, “Enterprise 
Risk Management – Integrated Framework”, online: 
http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf. 
22 See eg, the Turnbull Report in the United Kingdom, online: 
http://portal.surrey.ac.uk/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/RISK/BACKGROUND/LEGISLATION/TURNB
ULL/TURNBULL%20REPORT.PDF, and the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting in North America (the “Treadway Commission”), online: 
http://www.coso.org. 
23 ERM, “Overview” at 3. 
24 Basel II is legislated through the Office of the Supervisor of Financial Institutions, online: 
http://www.infosource.gc.ca/inst/sif/fed04-eng.asp. 
25 ERM, “Overview” at 35. 
26 Ibid at 8. 
27 Ibid at 4. 
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value-creating principle of ERM.  Financial risk is the most traditional form of risk 
analysis.  It is typically concerned with a company’s share price, its cost of undertaking 
business ventures, its purchasing power, and its ability to hedge risk.  Operational risk is 
an inter-disciplinary method of risk assessment that is embedded into functions such as 
human resources, product development, supply chain management, and information 
reporting.28  It works by harnessing the diverse skills of internal agents in order to 
identify risks within their functional expertise.  Following this risk assessment, senior 
management then operationalizes internal controls based on the agents’ 
recommendations.29  Finally, strategic risk is primarily concerned with reputation 
management and competitive pressures.30  The former speaks to the value that offers 
“premium product prices, lower costs for capital and labour, [and] improved loyalty 
from employees”,31 while the latter considers the business’ standing vis-à-vis the public 
and its competitors.32   
In what follows, an ERM analysis of the financial, operational, and strategic risks 
associated with bad faith discharges will show that the recent Keays reformulation has 
reduced the risk of employee terminations.  While this may seem reasonable on its face, 
a deeper analysis of the Wallace regime and the effect its precedents had on motivating 
employer best practices will show that the Supreme Court took a serious misstep when 
rendering its decision in Keays.   
 
WHAT WAS ONCE OLD… REVIEW OF DAMAGES IN CANADIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW 
The law of non-unionized employment in Canada is fundamentally rooted in the law of 
contract.  While scholars dispute the exact influence or control that traditional contract 
law doctrines have, or should have, over employment law,33 it is clear that courts have 
attached special significance to the contract of employment as compared to other 
commercial contracts.34  This flows from the judicial recognition that non-unionized 
employees are a vulnerable group in society in light of their dependence on employers to 
continually purchase their labour power without any mechanism for future job security.35  
Consequently, courts have held that traditional contract law doctrines must be re-thought 
                                                
28 Ibid at 10.  Michael Power, “The Invention of Operational Risk” (2005) Review of International 
Political Economy 577 at 584 [Power, “Operational Risk”]. 
29 Power, supra note 28 at 585. 
30 ERM, “Overview” at 10. 
31 Jan Bebbington, Carlos Larrinaga & Jose M. Moneva, “Corporate Social Reporting and 
Reputation Risk Management” (2007) Corporate Social Reporting 337 at 339 [Bebbington, 
“Reputation Risk Management”]. 
32 Ibid at 346. 
33 See Don Jack and Jane Southren, “The Problem with Wrongful Dismissal Law” 5 CLELJ 45 at 
47 [Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal”], and John Swan, “Damages for Wrongful 
Dismissal: Lessons from Wallace v. United Grain Growers” 6 CLELJ 313 [Swan, “Lessons from 
Wallace”]. 
34 See Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038 at 1051-52. 
35 See Wallace at paras 72-73. 
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in order to account for this inherent unfairness in non-unionized employment.36  While 
this has caused much frustration for commercial litigators,37 scholars have generally 
applauded courts’ progressive thinking.38  However, none of this has changed the fact 
that an employment relationship can still be terminated for any reason,39 provided 
adequate notice is given.  In this regard, the judiciary’s most significant innovation has 
been the remedy crafted to protect employees from acts of bad faith when they are at 
their most vulnerable; namely at the time of termination.  
i. The Early Years: Hadley and Addis/Peso’s Strict Limits on Wrongful 
Dismissal Recovery 
Canadian courts did not arrive at this progressive position overnight.  At first, contracts 
of employment were considered no different than any other commercial contract.  This 
meant that wrongful dismissal actions were subject to the cap on foreseeability imposed 
by Hadley v Baxendale,40 which limited recovery to only that which was in the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of contract formation.  Under the 19th century 
Hadley regime, the only damages plaintiffs could recover were compensation for pay in 
lieu of reasonable notice.41  This was premised on the artificial notion courts imputed 
that it was always in the contemplation of the parties that the contract may end at any 
time, provided adequate notice was given.42  Consequently, under the Hadley regime, the 
loss of employment and everything associated with it was not per se compensable; 
rather, only damages representing the proper length of notice that ought to have been 
given could be recovered.43  For many years to come, this doctrine had the effect of 
significantly restricting the scope of what was recoverable in a wrongful dismissal 
action.   
In Addis v Gramophone Co.,44 a case nearly a hundred years ahead of its time, the House 
of Lords considered whether an employee could recover losses in a wrongful dismissal 
action for harm occasioned by the manner of termination.  Relying on the analytical 
rubric of Hadley, the Law Lords rejected the claim.  Lord Loreburn noted that the 
employer could not be liable for “the injured feelings of the servant, or for the loss he 
                                                
36 Such progressive thinking has led courts to adopt different rules about: employment contract 
formation, see Adams v Comark Inc (1992), 81 Man R (2d) 119 (CA) regarding imputing terms of 
employment by conduct over time; interpretation, see Ceccol v Ontario Gymnastic Federation 
(2001), 55 OR (3d) 614 (CA) regarding the interpretation of employment contracts commensurate 
with the protection of employees; and modification, see Hobbs v TDI Canada Ltd (2004), 246 
DLR (4th) 43 (Ont CA), regarding the insufficiency of continued employment as valid 
consideration to sustain change to an employment contract. 
37 Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal” at 50-63. 
38 Geoffrey England, “Recent Developments in Individual Employment Law: Tell Me the Old, Old 
Story” 9 CLELJ 44 [England, “Tell Me the Old Story”]. 
39 Provided the reason does not run afoul of prohibited grounds set out by employment standards, 
labour relations, or human rights legislation. 
40 (1854) 9 Ex 341, 156 ER 145, 23 LJ Ex 179. 
41 Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal” at 48. 
42 Ibid.  See also Morrison v Abernathy School Board (1876), 3 SC (4th) 945 (HL). 
43 Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal” at 48. 
44 [1909] AC 488. 
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may sustain from the fact that his having been dismissed of itself makes it more difficult 
for him to obtain fresh employment.”45  In his concurring reasons, Lord Atkinson noted 
that a tort claim for malice, fraud, or defamation was the proper domain for such 
recovery, and that it had no place in an action for breach of contract.46  Addis remained 
the law in Canada for some time, and its holding was echoed nearly verbatim by the 
Supreme Court in 1966’s Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper,47 when it ruled that 
“damages [in a wrongful dismissal action] cannot be increased by reason of the 
circumstances of dismissal whether in respect of the respondent’s wounded feelings or 
the prejudicial effect upon his reputation and chances of finding other employment 
[emphasis added].”48  Addis and Peso governed the law of recovery in wrongful 
dismissal actions until the Supreme Court undertook its modernization of non-unionized 
employment law, beginning in 1989 with Vorvis v Insurance Corp of British Columbia.49   
ii. A Precursor of Things to Come: Vorvis and Machtinger’s New Direction 
Vorvis concerned the termination of an in-house lawyer, Eonis J. Vorvis, who was 
described as “conscientious to a fault” and produced “Cadillac[s] when Ford[s] would 
suffice”.50  He was subject to belittling and humiliating workload meetings each week 
that eventually necessitated medical attention, and later precipitated his termination.  
Although the Supreme Court rejected his appeal for aggravated and punitive damages, 
the majority broke new ground by holding that damages for mental distress occasioned 
by the manner of termination could be awarded in a wrongful dismissal action if the 
conduct complained of was an independently actionable wrong (e.g. a tort or separate 
breach of contract).  This was a huge step forward from Addis, which required 
discharged plaintiffs to decide whether to frame their action in tort or contract.  In 
dissent, Wilson J. urged the Court to collapse recovery for mental distress into the rubric 
of Hadley, noting that the second branch of the Hadley test permitted extended damages 
if there were special circumstances or particular plaintiff vulnerabilities that the 
defendant was aware of at the time of contract formation.51  This, she reasoned, was 
more appropriate than requiring another independently actionable wrong. 
For a case that broke new ground for the rights of terminated employees, it is important 
to note that the tone of Vorvis is remarkably sterile.  In particular, the only reference to 
employee vulnerability was made in passing by Wilson J.’s dissent.  Three years later, 
however, the Supreme Court unveiled its new policy with respect to non-unionized 
employees in Machtinger v. HOJ Industries.52  In that case, Iacobucci J. opened the 
Court’s ruling by acknowledging that “the law governing the termination of employment 
significantly affects the economic and psychological welfare of employees.”  He went on 
to describe employment as being of “central importance to our society”, “fundamental to 
an individual’s identity” and that non-unionized employees are “in an unequal 
                                                
45 Ibid at 491. 
46 Ibid at 496. 
47 [1966] 1 SCR 673. 
48 Ibid. 
49 [1989] 1 SCR 1085. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid at 1123. 
52 [1992] 1 SCR 986. 
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bargaining position” and their interests must be “protected” by remedially interpreting 
minimum standards legislation whenever possible.53  As a sign of things to come, 
Iacobucci J. also noted that “the manner in which employment can be terminated is 
equally important” to other policy considerations.  These values set the stage for Wallace 
v. United Grain Growers, the Supreme Court’s employment law opus that transformed 
the way termination of employment was thought of, managed, and litigated in Canada. 
iii. The Wallace Era: Wrongful Dismissal’s “Market Correction” 
If the Supreme Court embarked on a course correction in 1989 with Vorvis and made a 
pit stop in 1992 with Machtinger, then it truly arrived in 1997 with Wallace v United 
Grain Growers. 
Jack Wallace was a sales person who was induced away from lengthy and secure 
employment to join the defendant at the age of 45.  Despite being the top sales person in 
the company and being told he was doing a great job and could work until retirement, 
Wallace was inexplicably fired without notice at the age of 59.  The employer 
maintained egregious just cause allegations that damaged Wallace’s reputation in the 
industry until just before trial when they were withdrawn.  A lawyer whose academic 
publications had vigorously argued the need for a judicial remedy to address bad faith 
terminations represented Wallace at the Supreme Court.54  In his own words, Wallace’s 
lawyer thought “Canada’s existing law reflected the antiquated values of the United 
Kingdom, and that it was wrong to impose these values on Canadian employees”.55  In 
light of the direction Vorvis and Machtinger had gone in, he thought the time had finally 
come for Canadian wrongful dismissal law to receive a significant and comprehensive 
“market correction”. 
Wallace presented three arguments to the Supreme Court: first, that because of its special 
significance, the contract of employment was a “peace of mind” contract, the breach of 
which could give rise to aggravated damages; second, that the Court ought to recognize a 
freestanding tort of bad faith discharge; and third, in the alternative to tort, that the law 
should impose a contractual term of good faith and fair dealing, the breach of which 
could give rise to additional damages.  The Court rejected all three of Wallace’s 
proposals.56  However, instead of leaving him without recourse, it crafted a truly unique 
remedy that became known as “Wallace damages”.  Rather than create a tort or impose a 
contractual term up front, which could significantly interfere with an employer’s right to 
manage its workforce, the Court imposed, though the back door, a sui generis standard 
of good faith and fair dealing at the time of termination.  This preserved employers’ 
management rights during the life of the employment relationship, while still giving 
employees protection from acts of bad faith at the time of termination, which is when 
they are most vulnerable.  Notably, the Court’s remedy did not take the form of lump 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
54 See eg, Stacey Reginald Ball, “Bad Faith Discharge” (1994) 39 McGill LJ 568 [Ball, “Bad Faith 
Discharge”]. 
55 Author’s notes of Stacey Reginald Ball’s lecture to ‘Individual Employment Law’ (2550.03) at 
Osgoode Hall Law School, dated March 16, 2010. 
56 Wallace at para 88. 
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sum damages, but rather was fashioned in the form of an extension to the reasonable 
notice period. 
Similar to Machtinger, the Court’s starting premise was that the relationship between an 
employer and non-unionized employee is not one of equal power; a condition assumed 
in most other contractual relationships.57  This allowed the Court to declare that the 
contract of employment was distinct from other commercial contracts, thus giving it a 
special status in Canadian law.58  This flowed from the recognition that a power 
imbalance permeates all aspects of an employment contract, and that “compliance” with 
its terms is like an act of “submission”.59  Further, the Court noted that work is one of the 
most fundamental aspects of a person’s life, which provides not only a livelihood, but 
also a sense of identity and self-worth.  As such, the Court concluded that the loss of 
employment has a profound effect on a person’s emotional well being, and if that loss 
was occasioned by acts of bad faith, then the effect will be even greater.60  As a result, 
Wallace damages were fashioned in the form of a lengthened notice period because a 
victim of bad faith will take longer to obtain alternative work.61   
It is important to note that while taking longer to find alternative work is a tangible result 
of bad faith, the Court turned its back on Hadley, Addis/Peso, and to an extent, Vorvis, 
by deciding that the intangible injuries flowing from termination, in and of themselves, 
could also be compensable.62  Recall that past jurisprudence allowed recovery in a 
wrongful dismissal action only for the failure to provide reasonable notice, or later on, 
for an act that was already itself independently actionable.  To justify this paradigm shift, 
the Court analogized from libel law, where the act of defamation allows recovery for 
intangible injuries to one’s state of mind.63  The Court reasoned this was appropriate 
given the damage to Wallace’s professional reputation on account of his employer’s 
egregious (and groundless) accusations.  This analogy underlies the Court’s other 
examples of wrongdoing that, occurring in the course of termination, could also be 
compensable by Wallace damages.  Examples include: humiliation, embarrassment, and 
damage to self-worth or self-esteem.64 
 
NO EVIDENCE, NO PROBLEM: ANALYZING WALLACE DAMAGES’ IMPACT ON EMPLOYER 
CONDUCT 
i. Wrongful Dismissal Policy: Lessons Learned from Defamation Law 
It is crucial to note that since defamation law provides the justification for recovering 
intangible losses, Wallace damages, like libel, did not require the plaintiff to lead 
evidence of intent or harm suffered.  Defamation law justifies this on two grounds.  The 
                                                
57 Ibid at para 90. 
58 Ibid at para 91. 
59 Ibid at para 92. 
60 Ibid at para 94. 
61 Ibid at para 95. 
62 Ibid at para 104. 
63 Ibid at para 105. 
64 Ibid at para 103. 
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first is that, as a tort, damages in defamation are calculated on a compensatory, rather 
than expectation, basis; the intention is to put the plaintiff back in the position had the 
tortious act not occurred.  However, due to the difficulty of exhaustively approximating 
loss from harm to reputation, for policy reasons tort law recognizes the concept of 
damages-at-large, which is designed to compensate for such intangible injury.65  As a 
result, no evidence is required to establish proof of loss.   
 
Note that in employment-related tort actions, damages-at-large for reputational injury 
have awarded compensation for past and future income loss.66  The logic is that the 
tortious act may have not only resulted in the loss of a job, but also in the loss of a 
career.67  Further, in defamation cases, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the 
defendant intended to undertake the tortious action.  This is because Canadian and 
English common law has long held that a finding of recklessness will constitute 
“constructive malice”, satisfying a tort’s requirement for intent.68  In light of the Keays 
reformulation which burdens the plaintiff with having to prove actual loss from the 
alleged bad faith discharge, it is important to be mindful of the reasons why this was 
originally not the case. 
 
With respect to why plaintiffs ought not to bear a heavy evidentiary burden, the reasons 
why the Supreme Court rejected the “actual malice” rule from US defamation law are 
exemplary.  As mentioned, Canadian and English common law does not require the 
plaintiff to prove loss or intent in a defamation action.  In Hill v Church of Scientology,69 
the Church of Scientology urged the Supreme Court to adopt the US’s “actual malice” 
rule.  This rule eliminated the common law’s presumption of falsity and intent, instead 
requiring the plaintiff to prove that, at the time made, the defendant knew the defamatory 
                                                
65 McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd, [1965] 2 QB 86 (CA).  Consider the following passage 
from the speech of Lord Pearson: 
“Compensatory damages, in a case in which they are at large, may include…not 
only actual pecuniary loss and anticipated pecuniary loss or any social 
disadvantages which result, or may be thought likely to result, from the wrong 
which has been done.  They may also include the natural injury to his feelings -- the 
natural grief and distress which he may have felt at having been spoken of in defamatory 
terms, and if there has been any kind of high-handed, oppressive, insulting or 
contumelious behaviour by the defendant which increases the mental pain and 
suffering caused by the defamation and may constitute injury to the plaintiff’s 
pride and self-confidence, those are proper elements to be taken into account in a 
case where the damages are at large.” [Emphasis added] 
66 See eg, Drouillard v Cogeco Cable Inc, 2007 ONCA 322, 86 OR (3d) 431. 
67 Ibid at para 42. 
68 Fedele v Windsor Teachers Credit Union Ltd, 2001 CLLC 210-001 (Ont SCJ), aff’d 10 CCEL 
(3d) 254 (Ont CA).  See also Cogeco, supra note 68 paras 39-40, where the rule was applied in the 
context of the tort of interference with contractual relations.  Note that the application to 
employment may have limits on the grounds of policy considerations: see Piresferreira v Ayotte, 
2010 ONCA 384, 263 OAC 347 [“Piresferreira”] for a discussion of the tort of negligent 
infliction of mental suffering. 
69 [1995] 2 SCR 1130 [“Hill v Church of Scientology”]. 
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statements were false, or acted recklessly in not doing so.70  As such, the “actual malice” 
rule resembles the Keays formulation of bad faith damages in a number of ways.  Most 
significantly, both encumber plaintiffs with an evidentiary burden; with “actual malice” 
it is to prove falsity, and with Keays it is to prove harm.  
In Hill, the Supreme Court rejected “actual malice” based on the US’s troubled 
experience with the doctrine.  For one, the emphasis on proving falsity in defamation 
was said to result in overly detailed inquiries into matters of media procedure.71  This, in 
turn, significantly increased the length of the trial and discoveries, which often 
obfuscated the claim’s purpose and had the effect of coercing settlement.72  
Consequently, the burden of proving “actual malice” was said to actually increase, rather 
than decrease, the threat to freedom of expression.73  Similarly, the elongated inquiry 
was said to dramatically increase the cost of litigation, leaving many resource-strapped 
plaintiffs without access to justice.74  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in light of 
these obstacles, many thought that the purpose of the “actual malice” rule had become 
perverted by effectively protecting the dissemination of falsehoods, rather than thwarting 
them.75  Scholars argue the totality of this has exacted a major cost on American 
society.76  In concluding that the “actual malice” rule was not appropriate for Canadian 
jurisprudence, the Court noted:77 
 
[The law of defamation] is the means by which the individual may 
protect his or her reputation which may well be the most distinguishing 
feature of his or her character, personality and, perhaps, identity.  I 
simply cannot see that the [current] law of defamation is unduly 
restrictive or inhibiting.  Surely it is not requiring too much of 
individuals that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they 
publish. … Those who publish statements should assume a reasonable 
level of responsibility. [Emphasis added] 
With respect to the current defamation law’s presumption of falsity, the Court’s 
comment about it not being a burden on publishers in light of the significance of one’s 
reputation is telling.  Consider the following statement from Wallace regarding the effect 
a presumption of injury might have on employers:78 
 
The law should be mindful of the acute vulnerability of terminated 
employees and ensure their protection by encouraging proper conduct 
and preventing all injurious losses which might flow from acts of bad 
faith or unfair dealing on dismissal, both tangible and intangible.  I 
                                                
70 Ibid at para 122. 
71 Hill v Church of Scientology at para 129. 
72 Ibid at para 130. 
73 Ibid at para 129. 
74 Ibid at para 130. 
75 Ibid at para 128. 
76 Ibid at para 131. 
77 Ibid at para 137. 
78 Wallace at para 107. 
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note that there may be those who would say that this approach 
imposes an onerous obligation on employers.  I would respond simply 
by saying that I fail to see how it can be onerous to treat people fairly, 
reasonably, and decently at a time of trauma and despair.  In my view, 
the reasonable person would expect such treatment.  So should the law. 
[Emphasis added] 
In both situations, the Supreme Court held that the interests of the individual, in terms of 
equity and access to justice, were best served by burdening the more powerful entity 
(employers and publishers) with presumptions and duties that would otherwise be unfair, 
but-for the unequal relationship and resource disparity.  In other words, the Court 
recognized that defamation litigants might not be able to recover damages to their 
reputation if they were saddled with onerous evidentiary requirements; as a result, 
publishers are burdened with risks caused by the law’s presumption of falsity for 
defamatory statements they publish.  The assumption is that, in response, publishers will 
undertake more diligent publishing practices.  Similarly in Wallace, the Court realized 
terminations conducted in bad faith could cause far more injury to employees than pay in 
lieu of notice encompasses; consequently, the law imposes risks of employers having to 
compensate for invisible injuries caused by their termination process.  Again, the 
assumption is that employers will address this risk with more dignified and polished 
termination procedures. 
ii. The ERM-Reflexive Regulation Analysis: Connecting Wallace’s Uncertainty to 
Termination Best Practices 
So what happened in Wallace and Hill?  Simply put, the Supreme Court exercised an 
ingenious form of reflexive regulation.  In both cases, the law imposed a significant 
measure of uncertainty; in terms of the risk of defending litigation that assumes 
published statements are false and damaging, and the risk of defending litigation that 
assumes injury was caused by an egregious termination.   
From an ERM perspective, there are tremendous risks associated with such level of 
uncertainty.  First, there are obvious financial risks in terms of having to pay additional 
damages.  Further, because company auditors assess risks posed by ongoing litigation 
and their conclusions are a matter of public record, lawsuits for dismissals made in bad 
faith could theoretically affect a company’s share price as well.  A corporate reputation 
tarnished by allegations of bad faith also poses many problems in terms of strategic risk.  
Not only are court documents containing the allegations available to the public, but when 
the plaintiff was a former colleague, employment litigation has a tendency to polarize the 
workforce as well.  Depending on the nature of the Wallace claim, the damage to a 
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company’s reputation may also impair its ability to compete for top talent.79  Finally, in 
certain competitive industries, this damage can reverberate further and potentially erode 
price premiums that had previously been maintained by consumer loyalty.80 
In light of the foregoing, while operational procedures are the greatest source of Wallace 
liability, revising them also presents the greatest opportunity for risk mitigation and 
value creation; this is where the practice of operational risk comes in.  For example, 
human resources personnel and lawyers are frequently the “lightning rod” for 
employment disputes.  As part of a risk assessment that draws on their workplace 
expertise, these agents are uniquely positioned to enhance their roles in the eyes of 
senior management by identifying termination-related risks in company policies and 
procedures, which could be susceptible to Wallace damages’ ubiquitous uncertainty.  In 
response, management will operationalize new measures aimed at mitigating those 
risks.81  While it is outside the scope of this paper to attempt a thorough human resources 
analysis of the organizational value that can be derived from this, it would certainly be 
an area ripe for further research.  That said, the net result of tying the risk of uncertainty 
posed by Wallace damages’ presumption of injury to the self-correcting theory of 
reflexive regulation and ERM is that workplaces will function better as employers strive 
to isolate and eliminate possible liability for bad faith discharges. 
iii. Arbitrary by Prolific: Precedents Set by Wallace Damages 
In light of Wallace damages’ notorious uncertainty, ERM practitioners relied on case 
law to identify what conduct, practices, or procedures left employers vulnerable to 
allegations of bad faith.  In the years following Wallace, one lawyer noted that “the 
novel ways some employers exhibit their insensitivity to their dismissed workers, 
combined with an imaginative and diligent plaintiff’s bar, provide[s] endless fact 
scenarios.”82  In the ten years following this statement, plaintiffs’ lawyers have lived up 
to that expectation.  Without attempting to be exhaustive, courts have awarded Wallace 
damages for the following employer conduct:   
 
• Making serious but unsubstantiated allegations of just cause;83 
• Making express or implicitly derogatory remarks about the plaintiff to his 
or her former colleagues after dismissal;84 
                                                
79 See Kelly Pullen, “The Problem With Women” Toronto Life (10 May 2010), online: 
http://www.torontolife.com/daily/informer/from-print-edition-informer/2010/05/10/the-problem-
with-women/, which discusses Diane LaCalamita’s lawsuit against McCarthy Tetrault LLP for 
systemic gender discrimination.  Similarly, see Michelle Henry, “Woman alleges sexual 
discrimination in lawsuit against Toronto-based firm” Toronto Star (15 Feb 2011), regarding 
Jaime Laskis’ lawsuit against Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP for sex discrimination.  Anecdotally, 
the author has found that law students quickly become aware of these stories, especially during 
recruitment seasons. 
80 Bebbington, “Reputation Risk Management” at 339. 
81 Power, “Operational Risk” at 585. 
82 Joe Conforti, “Bad Faith Discharge and the Wallace Factor” (Paper presented to the Law 
Society of Upper Canada’s Second Annual Six Minute Employment Lawyer Conference, 29 April 
1999) [unpublished]. 
83 Rady v Canadian Medical Laboratories Ltd, [1999] OJ No 5858 (QL) (SCJ). 
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• Threatening to rescind a severance package and allege just cause if the 
employer’s offer was not accepted;85 
• Terminating a dissenting employee that refused to accept changes to the 
terms of employment in order to secure agreement from other employees;86 
• Refusing to provide a letter of reference;87 
• Failing to allow an employee to respond to allegations of wrongdoing prior 
to termination;88 
• Withholding statutory severance/termination pay in order to coerce 
settlement;89 
• Firing without first investigating the surrounding circumstances;90 
• Failing to inform a sick employee who resigned because of illness about 
the availability of disability benefits;91 
• Preventing an employee from qualifying for disability benefits by making 
unsubstantiated allegations of malingering to the insurance company;92 
• Firing employees returning to work from disability leave;93 
• Failing to cooperate in a timely manner with the discovery process;94 
• Engaging in abusive treatment that culminated in constructive dismissal 
(regardless of intent to humiliate or embarrass);95 
• Firing a “whistle blowing” employee;96 and 
• Conducting a termination by telephone message.97 
Although courts also frequently declined to award Wallace damages, the remedy quickly 
gained a reputation for being notoriously arbitrary.  In light of this, a cottage industry 
dedicated to educating employers about termination practices and how to minimize 
                                                                                                                    
84 Cassady v Wyeth-Ayerst Canada Ltd (1997), 163 DLR (4th) 1 (BCCA). 
85 Squires v Corner Brook Pulp & Paper Ltd (1999), 175 Nfld & PEIR 202 (Nfld CA). 
86 Slepenkova v Ivanov (2008), 60 CCEL (3d) 303 (Ont SCJ). 
87 Barakett v Levesque Beaubien Geoffrion Inc, 2001 NSCA 157, 198 NSR (2d) 135. 
88 Hampton v Thirty-Five Charlotte Ltd (1999), 218 NBR (2d) 109 (QB). 
89 Stolle v Daishinpan (Canada) Inc (1998), 37 CCEL (2d) 18 (BCSC). 
90 Rady v Canadian Medical Laboratories Ltd, supra note 86. 
91 Mernard v Royal Insurance Co of Canada (2000), 1 CCEL (3d) 305 (NBQB). 
92 Youkhanna v Spina’s Steel Workers Co (2001), 15 CCEL (3d) 99 (Ont SCJ). 
93 Skopitz v Intercorp Excelle Foods Inc (1999), 43 CCEL (2d) 253 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)). 
94 Antidormi v Blue Pumpkin Software Inc (2004), 35 CCEL (3d) 247 (Ont SCJ). 
95 Saunders v Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd (2002), 20 CCEL (3d) 220 (Ont SCJ). 
96 Mark v Westend Development Corp (2002), 18 CCEL (3d) 90 (Ont SCJ). 
97 Carter v Packall Packaging Inc (2004), 128 ACWS (3d) 516 (Ont SCJ). 
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liability quickly developed.98  This created a healthy eco-system of normative 
employment standards in the following way: The ubiquity of Wallace “bumps” enticed 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to risk carrying a wrongful dismissal action on contingency, resulting 
in more theories of bad faith being tested by courts, which led to more reported decisions 
on examples of bad faith that were fed back into the employment bar for dissemination 
to employers, who incorporated them into revised operational procedures.  The net result 
was an “upwardly ratcheting” system of normative employment standards for non-
unionized employees, functioning entirely under the purview of reflexive regulation. 
As the saying goes, however, “all good things must come to an end”.  While 
management-side employment lawyers loudly bemoaned advising on, and litigating 
against, Wallace damage claims,99 the judiciary soon began to sympathize with their 
cause.  Notably, the Honourable Justice Randall Scott Echlin of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice, a prominent employment law jurist and former management-side 
employment lawyer,100 lashed out at the plaintiff bar’s propensity to test novel theories 
of bad faith in Yanez v Canac Kitchens.101  Echlin J. described the plaintiff’s lawyer as 
“throw[ing] in the kitchen sink” in terms of ancillary claims, which resulted in “more 
than half of the total trial time [being] dedicated to the plaintiff’s claim for ‘Wallace 
damages’”.  The conduct in question concerned the employer’s failure to offer the 
statutory minimum level of notice for an employee with 16 years of service, and its 
insistence that he sign a Release, characterizing the offer as “more than fair”.  The 
employer led evidence that this was a mere mistake that was quickly rectified, but the 
plaintiff nonetheless pursued his claim for Wallace damages.  Echlin J. allowed the 
claim for wrongful dismissal, flatly denied a Wallace “bump”, and then fired a shot 
across the bow of plaintiff lawyers everywhere across Canada by suggesting 
unmeritorious Wallace claims might warrant sanctions involving reduced cost or damage 
awards.102 
                                                
98 In previous years, advising on how to avoid Wallace liability was a large function of the 
employment bar’s continuing legal education.  See eg, Canadian Institute’s 6th Annual Advanced 
Forum on Employment Law (2006), online: 
http://www.lerners.ca/content/documents/employment_law.pdf; McCarthy Tetrault LLP, “The 
Break-Up: Termination of Employment” (2006), online: 
http://www.advisor.ca/images/other/t/Termination_McCarthy.pdf; Law Society of Upper Canada’s 
8th Annual Six-Minute Employment Lawyer (2005), online: 
http://ecom.lsuc.on.ca/pdf/flyers/2005/sixminuteemployment.pdf. 
99 See eg, Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal”. 
100 “Honourable Randall Scott Echlin”, Canada Law Book Biography, online: 
http://www.canadalawbook.ca/honourable-justice-randall-scott-echlin.html. 
101 (2004), 45 CCEL (3d) 7 (Ont SCJ). 
102 Ibid at paras 34-43.  Consider the reprimand given by Echlin J.: 
“Wallace damages” ought not to be asserted in every case.  Only in the appropriate case.  
This lawsuit involved an employer who, while being less than generous, did attempt to 
do it right…when it was notified that it had made a mistake, rather than to stonewall, it 
immediately remedied the situation… 
… The time has now come to express this Court’s disapproval of routine assertions 
of “Wallace damage” claims which are not justified by the facts. 
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Echlin J.’s concerns about Wallace claims not grounded in fact are reasonable; indeed, in 
Wallace Iacobucci J. noted the remedy was not “anything akin to an automatic claim for 
damages…in every case of dismissal.”103  However, Echlin J.’s contention that such 
claims have no value and waste court time is not accurate; in addition to knowing what 
makes them liable, employers also need to know what conduct will not attract Wallace 
liability.  For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision that rejected Wallace 
damages for firing an employee on sick leave provided important clarification on how to 
conduct risky terminations with dignity and respect.104 
 
Despite the benefits of Wallace that this paper has advocated, it is no longer the law in 
Canada.  The new law that governs terminations conducted in bad faith is Honda v 
Keays.  As will be explained, the focus is no longer on what the employer has (or has 
not) done, but rather on the proof of injury the plaintiff must produce.  This paper’s 
position is that Keays’ approach removes the disciplining effect on employer conduct 
that Wallace had, and in effect, destroys the eco-system of precedent and education that 
reflexively created the normative system of ever-improving employment standards that 
Canadian workplaces used to enjoy.  
 
…IS NOW NEW AGAIN:  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN HONDA V KEAYS 
i. Extreme Facts Lead to Extreme Law 
Similar to Wallace, extreme facts lead to extreme law, and Honda v Keays had no 
shortage of either.  Kevin Keays was a dedicated, “conscientious”, but disabled, 
employee of Honda Canada who was terminated for just cause after fourteen years of 
service.  Eleven years after he began working, Keays was diagnosed with chronic fatigue 
syndrome and went on disability leave.  He returned to work a year later after his insurer 
determined he was fit to do so and was placed in Honda’s disability management 
program.  Even with light data entry work, Keays’ absences continued.  While the 
program permitted this to some extent, Honda became concerned once the medical notes 
                                                                                                                    
… Such claims seriously impede the potential consensual resolution of disputes which 
could otherwise be settled well short of trial.  Additionally, the assertion and defence of 
specious “Wallace claims” can consume large amounts of valuable court time; can 
increase the costs to all concerned; and can generally drive the parties apart. 
[T]hought must be given in future cases to appropriate deterrents against plaintiffs 
who assert “Wallace claims” which are clearly without merit and should not have 
been advanced.  Sanctions could include a diminution of either the costs award or 
the amount awarded for such dismissal claims.   
I make no reduction in the amount awarded to this plaintiff in this instance, nor do I 
reduce the amount granted for costs.  However, in future cases, clearly unmeritorious 
claims for “Wallace damages”, having little or no foundation on the evidence, may well 
face sanctions.  [Emphasis added] 
103 Wallace at para. 101. 
104 See Mulvihill v Ottawa (City), 2008 ONCA 201, 235 OAC 113. 
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he was required to obtain stopped being evaluative and instead became vague and self-
reporting.  The requirement to obtain notes for each absence led to a showdown, with 
Honda asking Keays to submit to an examination by their in-house doctor and Keays 
refusing to do so until he knew the exact purpose of the meeting.  Exacerbating this was 
Honda’s cancellation of Keays’ limited accommodation, allegedly as reprisal for Keays’ 
decision to retain counsel.  Honda sent Keays a letter stating that if he did not meet with 
their doctor, he would be fired.  As no explanation was provided, Keays refused and was 
fired for just cause.  He then sued for wrongful dismissal.   
The trial judge found that Honda’s conduct was egregious, reprehensible, and evidenced 
a “conspiracy” against Keays, who was awarded fifteen months notice, an additional 
nine months of Wallace damages, a costs premium fixed at $610,000, and a punitive 
damages award of $500,000, the largest in Canadian employment law history.  Honda 
appealed, and at the Court of Appeal for Ontario was successful only in reducing the 
punitive damages award and costs premium.  The majority found the award “generous, 
but fair”, with Goudge J.A. noting in dissent that the entire punitive damages award 
ought to have remained intact in light of Honda’s misconduct.  Honda appealed again, 
this time to the Supreme Court of Canada.   
Writing for the majority, Bastarache J. did not offer the expected guidance on how 
employers should lawfully terminate disabled employees.  Nor did he elaborate on how 
employers should accommodate employees with invisible disabilities, such as chronic 
fatigue syndrome, chronic pain, and fibromyalgia.  Rather, he side-stepped these issues 
completely and took the opportunity instead to reformulate how damages for bad faith 
were to be awarded in wrongful dismissal actions.  In doing so, the Court divested itself 
entirely from Wallace and arguably reunified the contract of employment with its 
commercial brethren under the principles of Hadley v Baxendale. 
ii. Back to Baxendale For The Damages Formerly Known as Wallace 
In Keays, the Court spent a great amount of time retracing damages in wrongful 
dismissal law before attempting to shoe-horn them all in under the auspice of Hadley v 
Baxendale, a case that had nothing to do with employment law. 
Rather than overturn Wallace, Vorvis, and other case law that espoused the Supreme 
Court’s modern policy on non-unionized employment, Bastarache J. attempted to pay 
homage to their principles by acknowledging that termination will always cause 
employees to suffer some degree of emotional harm, and that an employer’s acts of bad 
faith at this time can exacerbate this harm.  In doing so, Bastarache J. invoked Hadley’s 
stipulation that only that which was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the 
time of contract formation could be compensable.  Bastarache J. reasoned that when the 
employment contract is formed, both the employer and employee would have 
contemplated the debilitating impact of bad faith conduct at termination.  Thus, in the 
event an employer’s behaviour was particularly egregious and the employee can prove 
that it caused more harm than what was contemplated to be “normal”, then Bastarache J. 
held this difference could be compensable.  In other words, the Supreme Court took the 
values espoused by Wallace, made them foreseeable under the Hadley test, but as a 
purely compensatory remedy, now requires strict proof of actual losses.  In practice, this 
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has the effect of barring recover for many of the intangible injuries Wallace stood to 
protect against, such as embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of reputation.  As stated by 
Bastarache J.:105 
 
“Damages attributable to conduct in the manner of dismissal are always 
to be awarded under the Hadley principle.  Moreover, in cases where 
damages are awarded, no extension of the notice period is to be used to 
determine the proper amount to be paid. The amount is to be fixed 
according to the same principles and in the same way as in all other 
cases dealing with moral damages. Thus, if the employee can prove 
that the manner of dismissal caused mental distress that was in the 
contemplation of the parties, those damages will be awarded not 
through an arbitrary extension of the notice period, but through an 
award that reflects the actual damages.” [emphasis added] 
As a result of this, and in particular because Keays had not led evidence at trial of the 
termination’s impact on him, Kevin Keays’ nine-month Wallace extension was 
extinguished, as was his punitive damages award and cost premium, leaving him with 
only his original fifteen-month notice period and Honda’s bill of legal fees.  In dissent, 
LeBel and Fish JJ. expressed concern that the Court was turning its back on the 
progressive position it had taken with respect to non-unionized employees:106 
 
“[A]ny revision [of wrongful dismissal damages] must reflect the view 
accepted by this Court that the contract of employment is a good faith 
contract that is informed by the values protected by and recognized in 
the human rights codes and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, particularly in respect of discrimination.  As the Court 
found in Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., the contract of 
employment often reflects substantial power imbalances.  As a 
result, it must be performed and terminated in good faith, and 
fairly. 
… 
With respect, I believe that on the facts of this case, the award of 
additional damages for manner of dismissal (formerly “Wallace 
damages”) should stand.  The trial judge committed no overriding 
errors in this respect.  Although his review of the facts may not have 
been flawless, there was a sufficient basis for the findings of bad 
faith and discrimination in the manner in which the employment of 
the respondent, Kevin Keays, was terminated by Honda.  [Emphasis 
added] 
                                                
105 Wallace at para 59. 
106 Ibid at paras 81-82. 
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These statements suggest that plaintiffs need not to be held to such strict proof of actual 
injury, and that a trial judge’s imputed findings of fact may instead suffice.  For the 
reasons that follow, this ought to be the preferred interpretation of Keays going forward. 
 
 
ANALYZING KEAYS/HADLEY’S IMPACT ON EMPLOYER CONDUCT 
i. No Evidence, No Recovery: Bad Faith Damages Post-Keays 
In the wake of Keays, practitioners and scholars debated the actual impact the case 
would have.107  Some speculated that Keays was merely a superficial restatement of 
existing law that simply changed the form the damage award took in terms of extended 
notice vis-à-vis monetary lump sum.108  For example, shortly after Keays was released, a 
dismissed employee in Simmons v. Webb109 was awarded $20,000 in “moral damages” 
on account of his employer’s bad faith, despite the fact that the plaintiff led no evidence 
with respect to actual damages caused by the employer’s conduct at termination.   
Notwithstanding initial confusion, in the two years since Keays was released, appellate 
courts across Canada have begun to strictly enforce plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden with 
respect to proving loss caused by the manner of dismissal.110  For example, in Brien v 
Niagara Motors,111 the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned a bad faith damage award on 
account of conduct that had typically been a “lock” under Wallace: recklessly advancing 
unfounded just cause allegations.  In particular, the employer asserted it had just cause to 
terminate an employee with 23 years of service for, among other things, refusing to work 
weekends.  The trial judge found that the employer was simply trying to avoid paying 
out a lengthy notice period.  The Court of Appeal did not disagree, even noting that the 
employer’s misconduct could have sustained a damage award under Keays, however:112 
 
“…the mental distress that the respondent suffered upon her termination 
and the manner of that termination was not of the nature and scope to 
qualify for compensatory damages in accordance with that decision, as 
the respondent did not seek any medical attention, professional 
assistance or undergo any therapy for her mental distress.” 
[Emphasis added] 
                                                
107 See eg, Geoffrey England, “Evaluating the Implications of Honda Canada v. Keays” 14 CLELJ 
330; Daniel A. Lublin, “Wrongful Dismissal – Bad Faith Damages in Canadian Employment Law: 
Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays” (2009) 59 UNBLJ 153. 
108 Michael P. Fitzgibbon, “Different Doesn’t Necessarily Mean Different: A Discussion of Honda 
Canada Inc. v. Keays” (2009) 59 UNBLJ 166. 
109 (2008), 84 CCEL (3d) 196 (Ont SCJ). 
110 See eg, Jeffrey Goodman and Christopher Pigott, “Bad Faith Damages post-Honda” (Paper 
presented to the Law Society of Upper Canada’s 2010 Six Minute Employment Lawyer 
Conference, 15 June 2010) [unpublished]). 
111 2009 ONCA 887, 78 CCEL (3d) 10. 
112 Ibid at para 3. 
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With respect, the employee had to endure the cost and stress of taking her employer all 
the way to trial in order to realize her lawful entitlement of 24 months notice.  While 
Wallace’s uncertainty and presumption of injury may have facilitated settlement from 
the onset, Keays’ requirement that a plaintiff establish proof of intangible losses allows 
an employer to be far, far more bullish, as shown in Brien, when litigating wrongful 
dismissal claims.113 
A case from Saskatchewan, Fox v Silver Sage Housing Corporation,114 similarly 
illustrates the troubling turn wrongful dismissal law has taken.  In Fox, the trial judge 
made findings of fact against the employer on account of the following: that Fox was 
terminated based on management’s intense personal dislike for him, that Fox was lied to 
at the time of termination, that the employer orchestrated a “phony” corporate 
reorganization simply to “get rid” of Fox, and that the employer engaged in “vindictive 
and thoroughly unprofessional” behaviour by contacting the employer of Fox’s wife 
after his termination.  While the foregoing were previously clear indicia of bad faith, the 
court held that Fox “[had] not proven that the stress and depression he suffered is related 
to the manner in which he was treated.”  As such, Fox received no damages for his 
mistreatment.   
If it is not enough, as in Fox, for a court to clearly accept that the employer acted 
egregiously and that the employee suffered stress and depression as a result, what 
deterrents are there to make sure that employers treat discharged employees with dignity 
and respect?  While there is a reported case where the plaintiff called an expert witnesses 
to testify as to the impact the manner of termination had on her psyche,115 it is submitted 
that by having to proceed all the way to trial to do so, Keays is not doing terminated 
employees—previously recognized as a vulnerable group in society—any favours 
whatsoever. 
ii. The Danger of Subsuming Tort into Contract: Piresferreira and Soost 
While Keays has made it more difficult for employees to recover for intangible injuries, 
more dangerous is the very recent pronouncement that all claims related to the manner of 
termination, including freestanding causes of action in tort, must be subsumed into the 
Keays/Hadley framework.  Because damages in tort are calculated differently than in 
contract—based on making the plaintiff “whole” versus performance of the contract—
this has the potential to reduce damage awards for tortious conduct by an order of 
magnitude. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Piresferreira v Ayotte stands for this troubling 
precedent. In Piresferreira, the plaintiff’s claims arose from an altercation with her 
supervisor, which the court accepted was assault.  The supervisor was subject to minor 
discipline, and as reprisal, tried to place the plaintiff on a performance improvement 
                                                
113 See also Slepenkova v Ivanov, 2009 ONCA 526 at para 6, 74 CCEL (3d) 163, where the 
Ontario Court of Appeal overturned another bad faith award on account that the plaintiff had not 
led any evidence of “harm, mental distress or actual damage.” 
114 2008 SKQB 321, 70 CCEL (3d) 99. 
115 Bru v AGM Enterprises Ltd, 2008 BCSC 1680, 173 ACWS (3d) 495. 
Vol 20 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 55 
plan.  After being presented with the plan, the plaintiff went on sick leave and then long-
term disability, which represented the end of her active employment with Bell.  She then 
sued her supervisor for a variety of torts and, with respect to Bell, constructive dismissal.  
The trial judge found the supervisor personally liable for battery and intentional and 
negligent infliction of mental suffering, while Bell was held vicariously liable for the 
supervisor’s torts and directly liable for negligent infliction of mental suffering and 
constructive dismissal.  Due to tort’s measure of damages that allowed for past and 
future income loss, the plaintiff received over $500,000 in compensation. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision almost entirely.  In 
particular, it held that the tort of negligent infliction of mental suffering was not 
available in workplace disputes because the Keays/Hadley framework was intended to 
deal comprehensively with all mental distress claims arising from employer conduct 
coinciding with termination of employment:116 
 
In a case in which the employer’s allegedly tortious behaviour 
includes the termination of the employee, compensation for mental 
distress is available under the framework the Supreme Court has set 
out in Honda. In a case in which the employer does not terminate 
the employee, the employee who is caused mental distress by the 
employer’s abusive conduct can claim constructive dismissal and 
still have recourse to damages under the Honda framework. 
Recognizing the tort in the employment relationship would overtake 
and supplant that framework and all of the employment law 
jurisprudence from which it evolved. In other words, in the dismissal 
context, the law already provides a remedy in respect of the loss 
complained of here. [emphasis added] 
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, 
and post-traumatic stress disorder, all caused by the supervisor’s assault, the Court of 
Appeal rolled all her losses into the Keays/Hadley framework, which produced a mental 
distress award of merely $45,000. 
Piresferreira’s holding that tortious actions coinciding with the end of employment must 
be subsumed into a Hadley/Keays claim sets a dangerous precedent that withholds the 
tort measure of relief from those who need it the most.  That is, it makes no sense to 
permit actions in tort, or a tort scale of recovery, at other times during the relationship 
but not at the end, when an employee is—or at least previously was thought to be—most 
vulnerable.  Further, subsuming tort into the Keays/Hadley framework also conflates 
different heads of damages’ differing analytic purposes.  First, Hadley, which underlies 
Keays, is, and always has been, a limit on damages; it is not a ground for awarding 
them.117  Further, remedies in contract are compensatory to the extent that they reflect 
performance of the contract but-for the breach, which is why wrongful dismissal 
compensates with reasonable notice.  If an injury prevents a plaintiff from ever 
                                                
116 Piresferreira at para 61. 
117 Merrill Lynch Canada Inc v Soost, 2010 ABCA 251 at para 40, 487 AR 389 [“Soost”]. 
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performing another contract, then tort is, and always has been, the appropriate realm for 
recovery, even in employment law.118  Surely a mental distress award representing the 
loss of Piresferreira’s working life ought to be worth more than $45,000?119 
With respect to denying the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering, the Court of 
Appeal also divested itself from a long line of cases, if not a common law principle, that, 
as discussed, intent can be imputed from a finding of recklessness.  Indeed, McLachlin J. 
(as she was then) espoused this principle in Rahemtulla v. Vanfred Credit Union120 when 
she allowed recklessess in lieu of intent to sustain the tort of intentional infliction of 
metal suffering in a workplace dispute involving allegations of theft.121  Rather than 
address this principle head on in Piresferreira, the Court of Appeal simply distinguished 
Rahemtulla and suggested that workplace disputes require a higher level of 
“recklessness” to order to ever sustain an intentional tort.  The reasons for this, as one 
might suspect, flow from Keays:122 
"Recklessness" is a flexible term capable of different meanings in 
different contexts. … The test stated in Prinzo and reaffirmed in 
Correia maintains the distinction between intentional torts and 
negligence. As noted Weiler J.A. said in Prinzo that the "consequences 
must be known by the actor to be substantially certain to follow" 
(emphasis added [in original]). 
… 
I have already rejected the recognition of the tort of negligent infliction 
of mental suffering in an employment relationship. Accepting an 
objective sense of "recklessness" dependent on whether the harm 
ultimately suffered was foreseeable or likely to result should be 
                                                
118 See eg, Sulz v Attorney General et al, 2006 BCSC 99, 263 DLR (4th) 58 involving recovery of 
$950,000 for intentional infliction of mental suffering. 
119 The award of $87,855 for pay in lieu of notice is excluded as it serves a different analytic 
purpose. 
120 (1984), 51 BCLR 200 (SC). 
121 Ibid at paras 54-55.  Consider the following reasoning by McLachlin J.: 
Allegations of theft should not be made recklessly, without proper care for whether they 
are true or not. 
… 
A further requirement of the tort of willful infliction of mental distress is that the 
defendant's conduct be "plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was 
produced".  In the case at Bar this element is established. It was clearly foreseeable 
that the accusations of theft which the defendant made against the plaintiff would 
cause her profound distress. That distress could only be exacerbated by the 
defendant's failure to conduct a proper investigation or allow the plaintiff to defend 
herself. It was equally foreseeable that the accusations would continue to cause 
distress into the future, when, in seeking employment, she would be queried by 
prospective employers as to the reasons for her dismissal from the defendant's 
employ. [Emphasis added] 
122 Piresferreira at para 76. 
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rejected for the same reasons. Essentially, permitting liability on 
such a reduced standard would unduly interfere with the settled 
principles of employment law.  [Emphasis added] 
It is submitted that “settled principles of employment law” is more accurately read as, 
“new era of employment law under Keays”.  In this way, the Court of Appeal’s apparent 
hesitation to permit tort recovery to overlap or, more likely in their minds supplant, the 
Keays/Hadley framework is a very troubling proposition.  As discussed, these torts exist 
for a reason, and it is artificial and prejudicial to deny employees, but perhaps not other 
individuals, access to tort’s measure of relief simply on account of the presence of an 
employment relationship.  Such a policy invokes memories of past injustices rendered 
under the doctrine of common employment.123 
Similar to Piresferreira, the Alberta Court of Appeal recently held that pure economic 
loss—a tortious head of damage—caused by an alleged bad faith dismissal was not 
compensable under the Keays/Hadley framework.124  The plaintiff was an investment 
banker who was terminated without notice for a variety of reasons.  While the trial judge 
agreed with many of these reasons, he held that none were sufficient to sustain a finding 
of just cause.  Although the plaintiff found new employment within three weeks, many 
of his former clients did not follow him.  In light of this and the damage caused to the 
plaintiff’s reputation, the trial judge awarded $1.6 million in Keays damages for the 
economic loss resulting from the lost clients.  The Alberta Court of Appeal quashed the 
award, noting that the allegations of cause, notwithstanding actual harm suffered, did not 
constitute bad faith:125 
 
What if courts imposed heavy and almost automatic penalties on 
any defendant who alleged cause in good faith, but then failed to 
convince a judge or jury that it was bad enough? That would be 
most unfair to employers. It would deter alleging cause, so that 
employers with cause would instead have to give pay in lieu of notice (to 
avoid a second set of damages). This would be the slacker’s charter. It 
would significantly increase the expenses of hiring staff, and hence 
increase prices charged to innocent customers. I wish to stress that 
policy consideration. [Emphasis added] 
With respect to the Alberta Court of Appeal, just cause is the “capital punishment of 
employment law”;126 it is a high standard, and as such, there ought to be risks associated 
with invoking it.  Further, the court is obfuscating the issue; in this case, just cause was 
likely pursued because, in light of the plaintiff’s extremely high salary, it was cheaper to 
                                                
123 See eg, Priestly v Fowler (1837), 1 M&W 1 (Ex Ch) and Michael A. Stein, “Priestly v. Fowler 
and the Emerging Tort of Negligence” 44 BC L Rev 689, concerning the prejudicial policy 
considerations underlying the now-defunct doctrine of common employment, which precluded 
recovery in tort for workplace injuries precisely because of the presence of an employment 
relationship.   
124 Soost, supra note 120. 
125 Ibid at para 24. 
126 Peter Tong v Home Depot of Canada Inc (2004), 39 CCEL (3d) 59 (Ont SCJ) at para 1. 
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litigate than to settle.  Previously such exploitation of the employee’s position at 
termination would have engendered a finding of bad faith,127 but under Keays it was not 
made out.  Note, however, that even if it had been, the Alberta Court of Appeal was clear 
that economic loss flowing from dismissal is not compensable under the Keays/Hadley 
framework.128 
Based on the foregoing, it should be clear that, as a result of Keays, courts are now more 
hesitant than ever to allow full-fledged tort claims to coincide with actions for wrongful 
dismissal.  If aggrieved plaintiffs must now pick and chose a mutually exclusive cause of 
action, then isn’t it fair to say that Canadian employment law has simply come full circle 
and is now back to where it started over a hundred years ago under Addis/Peso’s strict 
limits on wrongful dismissal recovery? 
iii. The Reflexive Regulation-Erm Analysis: Reduced Termination Risks Bolster 
Operational Flexibility, But at What Cost? 
From an ERM perspective, the limits placed on recovery under the Keays/Hadley 
framework have significantly reduced the risks associated with termination.  Whereas 
Wallace’s presumption of injury focused the inquiry on the conduct of the employer, 
Keays’ evidence-based formula shifts the focus to what loss the employee actually 
suffered.  In many respects, this takes the risk out of termination. 
While a number of the financial risks from Wallace remain, others have been 
substantially reduced.  In particular, shareholders no longer have to worry about 
$950,000 damage awards under the tort measure of recovery;129 rather, having been 
collapsed into the Keays/Hadley rubric, bad faith damage awards, like other awards for 
mental distress, will be consistently modest.130  Similarly, since Keays damages are paid 
out in a lump sum, rather than as an extension to the notice period, an employer’s 
financial liability will be more predictable.  That is, not only will awards fall in line 
between the usual $20,000 - $75,000, irrespective of whether the employee is at the 
highest or lowest level of the company, but there will also be no uncertainty about the 
length of the notice period extension.  Under Wallace, the variance between a three to 
six month extension (or more) had dramatically different financial implications 
depending on the employee’s level of remuneration. 
The operational risks associated with bad faith terminations under Keays have also 
received a major adjustment.  Most significantly, employers’ operational procedures are 
now subject to far less scrutiny, which permits much more flexibility with respect to 
termination.  For example, while it was previously considered bad faith to fire someone 
without a face-to-face meeting,131 employees must now lead evidence that this caused 
                                                
127 See eg, Wallace note 3. 
128 Soost at para 28; see also Mathieson v Scotia Capital Inc (2010), 78 CCEL (3d) 76 (Ont SCJ) at 
paras 82-83. 
129 See Sulz v Attorney General et al, supra note 121. 
130 See eg, Ditchburn v Landis & Gyr Powers Ltd (1997), 34 OR (3d) 578 (CA), where the Ontario 
Court of Appeal upheld a $15,000 mental distress damage award for a 59 year old employee with 
27 years of service, who had been subject to particularly egregious treatment by his employer. 
131 See eg, Carter v Packall Packaging Inc, supra note 100. 
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them injury.  Given the difficulty of recovering for far more egregious conduct,132 
engendering liability for this seems quite improbable.  As a result, employers might, for 
example, now explore methods of mass terminations via electronic means.  A further 
benefit of Keays is that it eliminates the risk of aggressively litigating wrongful dismissal 
claims.  Employers previously faced sanctions for playing litigation “hardball”, in light 
of the parties’ drastic resource imbalance, but that is no longer the case.  Consequently, 
operational resources previously dedicated to preventative measures can now be cut or 
shifted to funding litigation.  Think of it this way: is it still necessary to pay for training 
on best termination practices if the liability now flows from the plaintiff’s actual injury 
and not the termination conduct itself? 
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Keays is the impact it will have on the 
reflexively regulated normative system of “upwardly ratcheting” employment standards.  
If Wallace created a healthy eco-system for ever-improving workplace norms, then it has 
been thoroughly deforested by Keays.  Consider this:  Given the prospect of suing 
employers that are willing, and now able, to play “hardball” under a framework that 
discourages awarding additional damages, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be disincentivized 
from bearing the risk of litigating on contingency.  As a result, less wrongful dismissal 
cases will be heard by the courts, leading to fewer reported decisions, which already 
have diminished relevance in light of the focus on plaintiff injury and not employer 
conduct.  Consequently, training on best practices will be deemphasized, meaning that 
operating procedures will stagnate, or worse, erode.  In other words, rather than having 
an incentive under Wallace to constantly improve, the net result under Keays will be a 
“ratcheting down” of normative employment standards.   
Recall that reflexive regulation operates by influencing actors’ normative practices so 
that a preferred course of conduct is prioritized in light of the risks associated with 
discouraged conduct; by taking the risk out of termination, the Supreme Court has 
stripped away an important layer of reflexive regulation that protected employees and 
improved norms for all workplaces across Canada.  Some have suggested the net effect 
of Keays will make employers more competitive in the face of international 
competition,133 but time will tell whether this was, in fact, the right trade-off to make. 
 
CONCLUSION: REVIVING THE TORT OF BAD FAITH DISCHARGE 
This paper has argued the critical importance of injecting risk into employers’ decision-
making process.  If the Keays/Hadley framework is going to stand, then thought must be 
given to reviving the tort of bad faith discharge that was urged on the Supreme Court 
                                                
132 See eg, Keays, supra note 2, Brien v Niagara Motors, supra note 114, and Fox v Silver Sage 
Housing Corporation, supra note 117. 
133 See Ryan Henry Edmonds, “All Hands to Starboard! Situating Wrongful Dismissal’s Recent 
Course Correction into Broader Labour Market Policy” (2010) [unpublished, submitted in 
fulfillment of ‘Labour and Employment Policy Colloquium’ (5550.03) at Osgoode Hall Law 
School] online: http://papers.ssrn/com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737944, for a discussion of 
the interplay between the judiciary’s role in using legal doctrine to set quantum of termination 
costs and broader labour market policy. 
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during the hearing in Wallace.134  Not only should the tort measure of recovery be 
available to employees in the most egregious of circumstances, but in order to positively 
influence normative employment standards, employers also need to know that their 
workplace practices are under judicial scrutiny.  As it stands, for this the Keays/Hadley 
framework is insufficient.  Although a tort of bad faith discharge would undoubtedly 
face judicial resistance for overlapping in purpose with Keays/Hadley, following a 
thorough understanding of this paper, and for the sake of protecting the standards of 
dignity and decency still enjoyed by workplaces across Canada, it is hoped the reader 
will realize such a remedy is nonetheless necessary. 
 
                                                
134 See Wallace at paras 75-78 and Ball, “Bad Faith Discharge”. 
